![]() ![]() When he tried again in 2008, it was with a proposal for a new European security architecture that Western countries could only dismiss as a means of neutering NATO and the European Union. Together with his image of a historic leader unafraid to restore Russia’s global clout, that narrative was key for legitimising his kleptocratic authoritarian rule.Īgreement with the West was not to be, of course. Putin had come to power on his promise to pacify Chechnya, part of the creation myth of his leadership as the sole means of preserving Russian sovereignty. That would silence criticism of his brutal war in breakaway Chechnya, promoting the deception that his massacring of civilians was necessary collateral damage in the common interest. Accepting him as an equal partner, the Kremlin’s logic went, would prompt Western leaders to acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence, free of liberal democratic values. ![]() That came two decades ago during a condolence call to his American counterpart George W Bush following the attacks of September 11, 2001.įar from unequivocally orienting his country toward the West, as many suggested at the time, Putin’s proposal to form an international anti-terrorism coalition was aimed at walling Russia off. ![]() ![]() It is a sobering reminder of just how long Vladimir Putin has been challenging the West that he was nearing only his third year as Russian president when he launched his initial attempt to impose a nineteenth-century vision of geopolitics by exploiting an international crisis. ![]()
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